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ABSTRACT
This paper responds to Franco Modigliani'srecent critique of our 1981
paper on the importance of intergenerational transfers for U.S.
savings.
Modigliani's paper is the latest salvo in along running debate over the
importance of intergenerational transfers inexplaining savings behavior.
While Modigliani corrects an algebraicerror of minor consequences in our
earlier paper, its correction doesnot, in our view, call into question the
fundamental conclusion that life cycleconsiderations can account for only a
small part of aggregate capital accumulation.Inevitably, it is possible to
challenge aspects of any complex empirical calculation.Modigliani's attacks
seem to us incorrect in most cases andgenerally fail to address our primary
method of determining the importance ofintergenerational transfers. Many
considerations at least as important as those raisedby Modigilani suggest
that our method produces an overestimate ofthe importance of life cycle
wealth.
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Franco Modigliani's (1984) review of theevidence and analysis in our
1981 paper is the latest salvo ina long running debate over the importanceof
intergenerational transfers in explainingsavings behavior. We welcome this
opportunity to address his criticisms and to placeour 1981 results in
perspective. While Modigliani corrects analgebraic error of minor
consequences in our earlier paper, its correction doesnot, in our view, call
into question the fundamental conclusionthat life cycle considerationscan
account for only a small part ofaggregate capital accumulation. Inevitably,
it is possible to challengeaspects of any complex empirical calculation.
Modigliani's attacks seem to us incorrect inmost cases and generally fail to
address our primary method ofdetermining the importance of intergenerational
transfers. Many considerations at leastas important as those raised by
Modigliani suggest that our method produces anoverestimate of the importance
of life cycle wealth. Modigliani is alsoextremely selective in his reporting
of the available evidence from otherstudies on the importance of
intergenerational transfers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section1 evaluates the pre—existing
empirical evidence on the importance of intergenerationaltransfers and
adduces a number of considerationssuggesting the plausibility of our
conclusion that life cycle considerationsare not paramount in explaining
aggregate savings. Section 2 reviews our principal wealth accumulationmethod
for estimating the importance of transfers andModigliani's criticisms of this
method. While Modigliani argues correctly thata modified treatment of
consumer durable expenditures would increase the estimated share oflife cycle
wealth, our preferred adjustment is quite small. Inaddition, we find his
attack on our definition of life cycle wealthas "non—standard" unpersuasive
both historically and analytically. Indeed,we view our definition as—3—
perfectly reasonable given the issue being addressed. Section 3 examines
estimates based on transfer flows, and shows that the available evidence does
not permit firm conclusions and provides no reason for doubting the
conclusions based on our main approach. Section 4 concludes the paper and
discusses directions for future research.
I. REVIEW OF EARLIER EVIDENCE
Modigliani's review of the available empirical evidence includes the
assertion that "all other estimates (agree) on the conclusion that wealth
received by inheritance and major gifts represent a modest fraction of the
total and that an exogenous large reduction in the flow of bequests would not
have a major effect on the privately held stock of wealth." This assertion is
belied by a large number of studies appearing before and after our 1981 paper
suggesting the overwhelming importance of bequest and other transfer saving in
aggregate wealth accumulation. Here we review five essentially independent
types of evidence suggesting the importance of intergenerational transfers.
We then argue that the survey evidence cited by Modigliani does not
demonstrate the unimportance of intergenerational transfers.
Historical Saving Patterns
The essential prediction of life cycle theory is that people save to
prepare for their retirement when they must dissave and consume. Without
periods of retirement or, at least, significantly decreased labor earnings at
the end of life there can be no life cycle motive for savings. Yet
substantial positive national saving rates antedate the advent of retirement
as an important economic phenomenon. Darby (1979) points out that, although
the ratio of expected retirement years to expected life span increased by 67—4—
percent from 1890 to 1930, aggregate saving rates showedno increase during
this period as would be predicted by the lifecycle theory. Darby states "...
thesaving income ratio during 1890—1930 was 3 to 4 timeshigher than can be
explained on even a generous reading of thezero—bequest model." Indeed,
Feldstein's (1977) calculations basedon the work of Kuznets suggest that the
rate of national saving in the United Stateswas substantially greater before
World War I than it has been since then.Clearly the incentive to save for
retirement was far smaller in the earlierperiod than it is today)- Another
type of evidence suggesting that retirement savingmay be less important than
many think is that the rate of saving today is high inmany less developed
countries where retirement is uncommon.
Age—Wealth Profiles
Decumulation of wealth after retirement isan essential aspect of the
life cycle theory. Yet simple tabulations ofwealth holdings by age, Mirer
(1979) or saving rates by age, Thurow (1976) andDanziger et. al. (1984), do
not support the central prediction that theaged dissave. Mirer reports that
wealth holding tends to increase withage. Thurow reports positive saving
rates for persons in all age groups, whileDanziger et.al. report that saving
rates increase with age with ".. .theelderly spend(ing) less than the
nonelderly at the same level of income and (with) thevery oldest of the
elderly having the lowest average propensity to consume". A numberof
questions can be raised about these and other analyses ofage wealth profiles
including possible selection biases and their failure to takeaccount of the
effects of Social Security. A carefulsurvey of the literature on this issue
by Bernheim (1986) concluded that—5—
"While some other studies have found evidence of wealth decumulation
after retirement, none have found that it occurs as rapidly as predicted
by life cycle models without bequest motives."
In his own analysis Bernheim (1986) finds ".. .relativelylittle dissaving
among any group of retirees", and his tests of rates of accumulation lead to
"...empiricalrefutation of life cycle implications."
Evidence from Annuity Markets
The strict life cycle model without allowance for bequest motives makes
strong predictions about the demand for annuities. Since the date of death is
uncertain and since bequests provide no utility, life cycle models imply that
there should be a very strong demand for annuity insurance. In fact, the
demand for annuities appears to be very weak. Friedman and Warshawsky (1984)
report that the loads on annuity insurance are no higher than the loads on
other frequently purchased types of insurance such as automobile collision
insurance or insurance against theft. Yet annuity purchases are a rarity.
Friedman and Warshawsky argue that it is necessary to invoke bequest motives
to explain this behavior. While Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) advance a
possible alternative explanation, namely that families will self—insure to a
large extent when annuity insurance is only available on very unfavorable
terms, this cannot fully account for the widespread failure to annuitize.
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) review a number of settings where
annuities are available on a fair or even subsidized basis and report that
even in these cases there is little demand to purchase annuities. They
conclude from this evidence that many consumers must have significant bequest
motives.—6—
Wealth and Subsequent Consumptjon
An accounting identity holds that thepresent value of a consumer's
future consumption must equal thepresent value of the income he will receive
plus his existing wealth minus any transfers that hewill make. This suggests
that the importance of transfersmay be inferred by looking at the fraction of
wealth and future labor income that is devotedto future consumption. Two
studies using very different types of data havetaken this approach to
estimating the importance of intergenerational transfers.
Darby (1979) used
data on individuals' wealth holding andsubsequent labor income and
consumption to conclude that at most 29 percent of U.S.private net worth is
devoted to future consumption.White (1978) used aggregate dataon the age
structure of the population, age earningsprofiles and consumption along with
a wide variety of parametric assumptions to concludethat the life cycle
hypothesis can account for only about aquarter of aggregate savings.
Simulation Studies
Simulation analyses also call into question thepure life cycle model.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1985) show, in a detailed lifecycle simulation model,
that realistic specification of U.S.demographics, preferences, and fiscal
institutions implies a very much smaller wealth to incomeratio than that
actually observed for U.S. Their results differ from those of Tobin(1967)
because of their inclusion of socialsecurity and their more realistic
assumptions concerning the growth rate of consumption over the lifecycle. In
order to generate substantial life cycle savings Tobin found itnecessary to
assume that consumption grows at a much faster rate than actually observed.—7—
Other simulation studies by Atkinson (1971) and Oulton (1976) point out
the difficulty of explaining wealth inequality on the basis of thezero
intergenerational transfer life cycle model. They find that the substantial
inequality in wealth relative to earnings can only be explained by bequest
behavior.
Modigliani' s Evidence
With his Table 1 Modigliani attempts to demonstrate anoverwhelming
preponderance of evidence indicating that intergenerational transfers are not
an important aspect of private wealth holdings. Most of his evidence takes
the form of the observation, obtained in severalsurveys, that most people
report most of their wealth coming from their own saving rather than from
bequests or gifts. There are a nun1ber of problems with Modigliani's inference
from this evidence. First, as he acknowledges, much of total wealthmay arise
from intergenerational transfers even if they are unimportant for thevast
majority of people who have little wealth and whose parents have or had little
wealth. Second, Modigliani's survey evidence fails inmany cases to take
account of intervivos gifts. Even where gifts are included it isunlikely
that respondents report fully "implicit gifts" such as low interestloans,
shares in the family business, or payments of tuition. Third,none of the
surveys cited by Modigliani take account of the return earned by recipients on
past inheritances or gifts. It is likely that the accumulated value of most
transfers substantially exceeds their nominal value. Forth, the substantial
underreporting of wealth has been documented in the surveys Modigliani cites.
It seems plausible that unearned wealth is particularly subject to
underreporting.—8—
Modigliani also attempts in Table 1 to provide estimates of the
importance of transfers based on "bequest flow" methods. These suffer from
the same difficulties of measurement as his other evidence. Someadditional
conceptual difficulties are noted in Section III.
We turn next to a review of our method of accounting andModigliani's
criticisms of it. Before plunging into the details of thecalculation, it is
perhaps appropriate to reiterate that our reading of the evidence is less
extreme than Modigliani suggests. Robert Solow (1982) considers much of the
same evidence, and states "My tentative conviction is that (the) view (that
intergenerational transfers appear to be the major element determining U.S.
wealth accumulation) is essentially right. It is reinforcedby general
qualitative considerations."
II. DEFINING AND MEASURING LIFE CYCLE WEALTH
In his paper Modigliani focuses to avery large extent on two issues. The
first is "bequest flow" estimates of the importance ofintergenerational
transfers to savings, and the second is theproper definition of life cycle
versus transfer wealth. Modigliani devotes little space to our main
contribution, the direct calculation of life cycle wealth. We devoted most of
our paper to the direct calculation of life cycle wealth because, as we
stressed, the "bequest flow" approach overestimates life cycle wealth due to
the absence of data on a variety of transfer flows. In addition, unlike the
direct calculation, the bequest flow approach requires invokingsteady state
and other simplifying assumptions that may not be valid. This section
considers the measurement of life cycle wealth while the next section treats
the bequest flow calculations.—9—
We address first the issue of properly defining life cycle wealth and
then discusses our direct estimates of life cycle wealth, including the proper
adjustment for the consumption of durables stressed by Modigliani. This
adjustment does not alter the basic conclusion that the pure life cycle model
without intergenerational transfers cannot explain the bulk of U.S. wealth.
We also point out several reasons why our calculation of life cycle wealth
appears to be significantly upward biased.
Defining Life Cycle Wealth
Our definition of life cycle wealth is motivated by the following
question: Are the U.S. data on labor earnings, rates of return, consumption,
and wealth broadly consistent with the view that intergenerational transfers
play a negligible role in U.S. wealth accumulation? Stated differently, can
one reject the null hypothesis that the life cycle model without
intergenerational transfers fully explains U.S. wealth? We defined life cycle
wealth according to the theorectical prediction of the zero intergenerational
transfer, life cycle model, namely as the sum over cohorts of the accumulated
difference between past streams of labor earnings and consumption. We defined
the difference between actual U.S. wealth and life cycle wealth as transfer
wealth. Transfer wealth must equal the sum over cohorts of the accumulated
value of past net intergenerational transfers.
While Modigliani asserts that this definition is non—standard and
unconventional, it is as standard as the life cycle theory itself; indeed, it
is the definition used by Ando and Modigliani (1963), and it is the definition
used in the two previous extensive analyses by Tobin (1967) and Darby (1979)
of the role of the pure life cycle model in U.S. wealth accumulation. While
Modigliani suggests that this definition yields "nonsensical" results, his—10—
example of the use of this definition in his Table 2 clearly illustrates its
ability to distinguish between economies with and without significant
intergenerational transfers.
Rather than totaling over cohorts the accumulated difference between
labor earnings and consumption, Modigliani would have us totalover cohorts
the sum of their past saving, where saving is income lessconsumption. The
problem with this definition is that income may include capital income earned
on previously received intergenerational transfers. Hence, the sum ofsaving
out of income can not be used to test with maximum power the null hypothesis
that the zero transfer life cycle model accounts foressentially all of U.S.
wealth because income may itself reflect intergenerational transfers. Norcan
Modigliani's definition be implemented without extremely elaborate adjustments
to remove the inflation component of the capital income earned frominvesting
gifts and bequests. Implementing it without inflation adjustments would lead
to the unacceptable implication that perfectly balanced inflation would
increase the share of life cycle wealth; i.e.
,transferwealth defined by
Modigliani is the simple sum of past net transfer received by living
generations measured in nominal terms. A final limitation of Modigliani's
definition is that it does not correspond to an answer toany well posed
behavioral question.
Once one finds that the data are highly inconsistent with the zero
transfer, life cycle formulation, a natural behavioral question to raise is:
What would be the impact on U.S. wealth of eliminating all intergenerational
transfers? We raised this economic, as opposed to accounting, issue in our
paper, indicating how our definition and estimate of life cycle wealth could
be used to address this unrealistic, but nonetheless interesting
counterfactual. The answer to this economic question is, of course,—11—
independent of accounting convention. Our assessment, to which we still
subscribe, was that totally eliminating intergenerational transfer would, in
partial equilibrium, reduce U.S. wealth by at least 50 percent. This economic
as opposed to accounting statement suggests a much more important role for
intergenerational transfers than has generally been thought to be the case.
The Age of Adulthood
A second issue of definition discussed in our paper and raised as well by
Modigliani is the proper age of adulthood. As Modigliani points out this is
an arbitrary choice. At one extreme one could assume that adulthood begins at
birth, in which case the accumulated difference between the labor earnings and
consumption of young cohorts would be significant negative numbers, and our
calculation of 1974 life cycle wealth would be substantially smaller than the
figure we report; indeed, this assumption would lead to a negative value for
life cycle wealth. At the opposite extreme one could assume that adulthood
begins at a very late age, say age 40. In this case all the consumption and
earnings of those under age 40 must be imputed to their relatives over age 40,
and the value of life cycle wealth would be very much larger than we report.
In our calculation of 1974 life cycle wealth we choose age 18 as the age
of adulthood. In our view this age, while appropriate for the post war
generations alive in 1974, is probably too old for older cohorts alive in 1974
some of whom were born in the last century. Many of these older generations
entered the labor force at younger ages than is currently typical, and they
certainly had much shorter lifespans. Hence, it seems reasonable to believe
that the generally perceived age of adulthood for the older cohorts in 1974
was less than age 18, and perhaps as young as 16. Indeed, until the l950s
labor force participation rates were calculated relative to the over 14—12—
population. Had we used age 16 for older 1974 cohorts as theage of adulthood
we would have reported considerably less life cycle wealth than whatwe did
report.
Given our choice of age 18 as the age of adulthood,we ascribe all
consumption expenditures and earnings of those 18 and over to those adults who
are directly consuming the expenditures and supplying the labor.Hence, the
consumption of a 25 year old graduate student of educational services,as well
as food, clothing, etc. is counted as her consumption rather than that of her
parents. In contrast, Modigliani argues that the consumption of educational
services should be ascribed to the parents when theparents are financing the
education. A problem with this line of reasoning is thatmoney is fungible;
i.e. ,thereis no reason to treat differently the case ofa graduate student
whose tuition is directly paid by her parents and thegraduate student who
pays the tuition from her own check book, but receives an equivalent amount of
money from her parents "for" food, "for" a car, "for" a vacation, etc. More
importantly, provision of higher education and support during the period of
education represents a major form of intergenerational transfers andshould be
treated as such. In sum, we see no reasonableway to label certain payments
from parents to their adult children as "transfers" and othersas "parental
consumption". From the perspective of the customary view of the life cycle
model it would be inappropriate to treat children as adults, but it isequally
inappropriate to treat adults as children.
Consumer Durables
In our earlier paper we reported 1974 life cycle wealth of $733 billion
compared with 1974 household net worth of $3,884 billion, implying that 1974
life cycle wealth is only 18.9 percent of 1974 total wealth. The life cycle—l 3—
wealth figure was constructed by accumulating earnings less consumption for
each male and female cohort with living members in 1974. Theage and sex—
specific levels of consumption and earnings used in this calculation were
derived by distributing total consumption and labor earnings in eachyear
beginning in 1900 according to cross section profiles of relative consumption
and earnings by age and sex.
In forming cross section relative age—consumption profiles we simply used
expenditures on durables rather than imputing rent on durables. As Modigliani
points out, this treatment of durables has the effect of ascribing too much
consumption in a given year to younger individuals and too little consumption
to older individuals and biases our calculation towards too little lifecycle
wealth. In retrospect there is a very easy way to adjust for durables. This
is just to exclude the stock of consumer durables from total wealth. Our
previous treatment of durables involved treating durables expenditures as
consumption for purposes of calculating cohort—specific values of consumption,
but, unfortunately, not for purposes of calculating total wealth. Stated
differently, our calculation of life cycle wealth really corresponds to life
cycle accumulation of wealth excluding durables and should be compared with
total wealth excluding durables. Since the stock of durables in 1974was $530
billion, this correction lowers the total stock of wealth to be explained to
$3,349. Since $773 billion is only 21.9 percent of adjusted total wealth,
this adjustment raises our estimate of the life cycle wealth share only
trivially, from 18.9 percent to 21.9 percent.
In contrast to this correction of 3 percentage points, the correction for
the failure to impute rent on durables reported by Modigliani is 26percent
raising from 18.9 to 44.9 percent the share of life cycle wealth. Before
thinking of the straightforward adjustment procedure described in the—14—
preceding paragraph, we assisted Modigliani in using the 1972 Consumer
Expenditure Survey to try to estimate both the stock of durablesand the
implicit rent on durables. This initial crude adjustment for durables
involved using the 1972 cross sectional durablesexpenditure information and
invoking steady state assumptions to infer past expenditureson durables by
households in the 1972 survey. These estimatedpast purchases of durables
were then depreciated to arrive at estimated 1972 stocks ofdurables, from
which rent was then imputed. The calculation turnedout to be quite sensitive
to the assumed steady state growth rate. One version of thecalculation
corresponds to Modigliani's reported 26 percent adjustment. We place little
reliance on this adjustment since, unlikeany of the other calculations in our
estimation of life cycle wealth, it invokes quite unrealisticsteady state
assumptions. These include the assumption that past expenditureson durables
at each age equaled the 1972 expenditure of thecorresponding age group
deflated by a constant growth rate factor.
Modigliani's preferred adjustment raises the estimate of lifecycle
wealth from $733 billion to $1,743 billion, or 44.9percent of total wealth.
Note that while this figure is over twice as largeas our much more defensible
21.9 percent adjusted estimate, life cycle wealth is still lessthan half of
total wealth implying an important role for intergenerationaltransfers.
Upward Biases in our Original Calculation of Life Cycle Wealth
As we pointed out in our original paper there are several biases inour
calculation suggesting that we overestimated life cycle wealth. In orderto
generate at least some positive value for life cycle wealth we adjusted
upwards standard estimates of the labor income of the self—employed by 20
percent. Since the ratio of self employed workers to employees was—15—
substantially larger in the prewar period than it is today, the calculated
value of life cycle wealth is fairly sensitive to this assumption. Using
standard estimates of the labor income of proprietors would reduce estimated
life cycle wealth by about $700 billion. We also assumed in the calculation a
ratio of average female earnings to average male earnings equal to .55,
although the data suggest that a ratio closer to .45 is more appropriate.
Using .45 as the ratio would reduce our estimate of life cycle wealth by
between $100 and $150 billion. A variety of other biases also increased our
estimate of life cycle wealth. These include our assumption that the profile
of relative consumption by age is flat after age 75 and our assumption of zero
earnings after age 75. In addition, one could argue that for many older 1974
cohorts an age of adulthood younger than 18 is appropriate. This adjustment
would lower the estimate significantly. Needless to say, if we adjust for
durables by simply excluding the stock of durables from total wealth and make
these additional adjustments to our initial $733 billion figure, we would
arrive at a negative value of life cycle wealth.
Explaining our Result
It may be useful to repeat our basic explanation for why life cycle wealth is
so small in the U.S. Unlike simple class room depictions of hump saving in
which the consumption profile is flat and the earnings profile rises to
retirement, actual age earnings and age consumption profiles, such as those in
Figures 1, and 2 which are reproduced from our paper, have essentially
identical shapes and levels prior to at least age 45. Between ages 45 and 60
there is clearly some hump saving in that earnings profiles continue to rise
through the early 50s and then decline slowly through age 60 while consumption
profiles flatten out, and after age 60 there is clearly dissaving in the sense—16—
that the age consumption profile exceeds theage earnings profile. However,
since this pattern of hump saving and dissaving occurs quite late in the life
cycle one would not expect a large accumulation of life cycle wealth in the
aggregate because the life cycle wealth of the more numerous generations below
age 45 is so small. The simple fact is that consumption does not rise more
rapidly through life than labor income.
III. LOWER BOUND ESTIMATES OF LIFE CYCLE WEALTH BASED ON THE"BEQUEST FLOW
METHOD"
The "bequest flow" method refers to using information on thecurrent flow
of intergenerational transfers and assuming theeconomy is in a steady state
to estimate stocks of life cycle wealth. In our originalpaper we presented
estimates for transfer wealth based on this method. Modigliani focuses
extensively on this short section of our paper. We stressed that these were
lower bound estimates because there are no data sources thatsystematically
report intergenerational transfers made in the form of implicit and explicit
gifts. Explicit gifts, which may be in kind as well as in cash, are clearly
acknowledged as such by donors and recipients. Implicit gifts, such as making
one's son an equal earning partner in a lucrative family business orproviding
low interest loans to children, may not be viewed as a gift by donors and
recipients and would be hard to identify and quantify in a survey. Since the
U.S. distribution of wealth is highly skewed implicit gifts, while perhaps
small in number, could be very large in value. Hence, any flow estimates of
transfer wealth, including those of Modigliani, should be viewed as
potentially seriously downwards biased.—17—
A second concern with the bequest flow method is that it requires
invoking steady state assumptions that may be far from valid. It may be, for
example, that the flow of intergenerational transfers in relation to the scale
of the economy was much greater in the 1920s than in the 1960s and 1970s, the
period for which our transfer flow data is available. Finally, even if one is
willing to accept the steady state assumption, the simple formulae that we and
Modigliani examine assumes that everyone dies at a given age D, that all
transfers are received at a given age I, and all transfers are made at a given
age, C. This is obviously unrealistic, and it is not clear exactly what
choice of these three ages best approximates reality. As we indicated in the
beginning of our earlier paper, the correct approximation depends critically
on the steady state value of the real interest rate, r, and the steady state
growth rate, n. For example, when r exceeds n, our measure of transfer wealth
depends on the period of accumulation. Hence, if half of transfers are
received at age 20 and half at age 60, using age 40 for I would be
inappropriate, since transfers received at age 20 should receive more weight
in the approximation formula because they are accumulated for a much longer
period than transfers received at age 60 and because the accumulation function
is a nonlinear function of age. In sum, we feel that direct calculation of
life cycle wealth is decidedly preferred to using the steady state "bequest
flow" method both because of the nature of available data and the
approximations required in the latter approach. This view led to the emphasis
in our earlier paper on the direct estimation of life cycle wealth.
Turning to our actual flow calculation, Modigliani points out an
algebraic error in our formula relating the stock of transfer wealth, T, to
the annual flow of intergenerational transfers, t. The correct formula, which
is simply a rewrite of Modigliani's, is:—18—
T ——s--- e_D
[i—e] (r—n)
In the formula in our paper we omitted the last term e(Tr)I.
To illustrate the implication of the formula we discussed an example in
which D equals 55 (a real word age of death of 73 if theage of adulthood is
18), (G—I) equals 30, and (r—n) equals .01. Because of our algebraic error we
did not assume a value for I. In his paper Modigliani uses a value of Iequal
to 25, which corresponds to a real world age of 43. We favor a value of I
equal to 15 reflecting the fact that the appropriate approximation to I should
be smaller if r exceeds n than if r equals n; i.e., since when r exceedsn,
transfer wealth depends on the period of accumulation using the simple
transfer—weighted age of transfer receipt in the formula would bias downward
the estimated stock of transfer wealth. It appears that a similar statement
is true of the choice of the age gap factor (C—I); thus, it is likely thatour
choice of 30 for (C—I) is too small given that we apply the formula to the
case that r exceeds n.
In the illustration in our paper we used a value of 45 for the factor
multiplying t in the formula for T. Taking I equal to 25 Modigliani
calculates a value of 35 for this factor. With our preferred value for I of
15 the factor is 39. Since we reported a lower bound estimate for t of $45.4
billion our revised upper bound "bequest flow" estimate for the stock of life
cycle wealth, using I equals 15, is $2,113 billion, which is 54 percent of
1974 household wealth. Note that if we use an age gap (C—I) factor of 45
which may be more appropriate since r exceeds n, the upper bound estimate of
life cycle wealth is $1,429 billion, or only 37 percent of 1974 household net
worth.—19—
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS FOR VIEWING THE LIFE CYCLE MODEL ANDFOR
FUTURERESEARCH
The finding that intergenerational transfers are a key feature of U.S.
wealth accumulation has not lessened interest in the pure life cycle model.
On the contrary, a variety of researchers, including Sheshinski and Weiss
(1981), Davies (1981), Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1983), and Abel
(1983), and Hubbard (l984a, l984b) have investigated the potential for
unintentional intergenerational transfers within models in which households
have pure life cycle preferences, but in which annuity markets do not exist.
Kotlikoff, Spivak, and Shoven (1984, 1986) also consider nonaltruistic life
cycle preferences and show that significant intergenerational transfers can
arise in a setting of partial annuity insurance provided by family members.
Other researchers, such as Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) view
intergenerational transfers within a pure life cycle model as the implicit
payment by parents to their children for material and other types of support.
A third view of intergeneration transfers that contains an important role for
the pure life cycle model is espoused by Kurz (1984) and others,namely that
society is heterogeneous, with a large number of relatively poor households
with pure life cycle preferences and a small number of relatively altruistic
extended families with significant bequest motives.
Since the short and potentially long run impact of fiscal policies
depends on the relative number of life cycle households in the U.S. economy, a
statistic that is unknown, it remains important to understand the impact of
fiscal policies within the pure life cycle model. To that end Summers (1981),
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1986), Seidinan (1984), Gahvari (1985), Lawrence
(1983), and many others have examined fiscal policies within pure life cycle
models. These theoretical and simulation studies have been accompanied by a—20—
large volume of empirical research testing the implications of thepure life
cycle model.
In sum, research on, and interest in the life cycle model hasnever been
greater than in the last few years. Moreover, the nature and heterogeneity of
household saving behavior remains poorly understood. Inour view, additional
research investigating the nature of saving preferences rather thanadditional
wealth accounting holds the key to understanding thevery important role of
intergenerational transfers as well as the contribution ofpure life cycle
saving motives to U.S. wealth accumulation.—21—
Notes
1.More recent statistics also point to an inversecorrelation between the
duration of retirement and the U.S. saving rate.Kotlikoff and Smith
(1983) report that since 1950 the expected duration ofretirement and
other nonworking periods for theaverage adult has almost doubled. This
change coincided with a secular decline of over 40percent in the rate of
U.S. saving out of net national product (Boskinand Kotlikoff,l985).N
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